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Traditionally, military courts were deemed independent of Ar-
ticle III federal courts. This independence was rationalized on
the premise that since the military justice system was created by
Congress under an express grant of power in Article I of the Con-
stitution, it should be exclusively regulated by Congress. The con-
cept of independence produced a military justice system that was
effectively insulated from federal decisional law.
In 1953 the Supreme Court destroyed the independence concept.
Burns v. Wilson,' a military habeas corpus decision, established
that military courts must protect a serviceman's basic constitu-
tional rights. If the military courts failed to protect these rights,
then federal courts would grant habeas corpus to military defend-
ants.
Since this landmark case was decided, federal decisional law
has had a profound effect on military law. Some federal cases
are now given stare decisis effect by military courts. Other cases
have induced the military courts to modify their appellate process.
I will explore in depth these recent developments in military law.
STRUCTURE AND NATURE OF MILITARY COURTS
Intermediate appellate courts in the military are courts of mil-
itary review (although there are several courts of military review,
one for each respective branch of the military, I will hereafter re-
fer to them collectively as CMR).2 The CMR consists of three
members who are usually career military judges. Jurisdiction of
the CMR extends to: all cases affecting general or flag officers;
all cases in which commissioned officers, cadets, or midshipmen
1. 346 U.S. 137 (1953).
2. Prior to the Military Justice Act of 1968, amending 10 U.S.C. §§ 801-
940, the Court of Military Review was known as the Board of Military
Review.
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are dismissed; all cases in which the sentence is a dishonorable or
bad conduct discharge; all cases in which the sentence is one year
of confinement or more.3 Note particularly that sentences of less
than one year coupled with a discharge that is not dishonorable or
bad conduct are not reviewable by the CMR.
The military's Supreme Court is the Court of Military Appeals
(CMA), created by provisions in the Uniform Code of Military Jus-
tice in 1950.4 The CMA consists of three civilian attorneys ap-
pointed by the President for fifteen year terms; in addition the
President also designates the chief judge. The CMA has power to
review questions of law but not fact; the CIVIR is the highest
military court where questions of fact can be reviewed. Lack of
power to review questions of fact is a fundamental difference be-
tween the CMA and the Supreme Court. Jurisdiction of the CMA
extends to: all cases affecting general or flag officers; all cases in
which death is imposed; all cases reviewed by the CMR which the
Judge Advocate General has certified to be reviewed by the CMA;
all cases reviewed by the CMR which, upon petition of the accused
to the CMA and good cause shown, the CMA accepts. The Presi-
dent, as commander-in-chief, has the power to review CMA deci-
sions," however, this power is rarely exercised.
Most of the law defining the rights of military personnel is found
in the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ),7 in the Manual
for Courts-Martial," and in CMR and CMA decisions. Twenty
years ago it would have been safe to say that practically all the
law affecting the military could be found in the above sources.
The transition from "practically all" to "most" is primarily the re-
sult of military courts responding to civilian law. Today, federal
court decisional law does affect the rights of people in the mili-
tary. To appreciate the transition requires a brief discussion of
3. U.C.M.J., Art. 66, 10 U.S.C. § 866 (1970).
4. U.C.M.J., Art. 67, 10 U.S.C. § 867 (1970).
5. Id. However, the CMA can review the sufficiency of the evidence
to convict. See Karlen, Civilian and Military Justice at the Appellate Level,
1968 Wis. L. REv. 786 (1968).
6. President Nixon opted to exercise this power in the Lt. Calley case.
7. U.C.M.J., 10 U.S.C. §§ 801-940.
8. Manual for Courts-martial (1969 Rev. Ed.). This is the bible for
court-martial procedure. Many substantive rights (such as limitation on
barrack searches) are also found in the Manual.
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the historical view that military courts were independent of Art.
III federal courts.
Since military courts were created by Congress by a grant of
power in Art. I of the Constitution, the historical view favored a
military justice system free of Art. III court interference. In a
series of United States Supreme Court decisions up to the early
1950's, 9 the independence of the military courts was deemed to
preclude federal court interference via habeas corpus except in
those cases in which the military had no jurisdiction to try the ac-
cused or in cases in which the military exceeded its own power in
the sentence pronounced.10 This extremely narrow ground for
granting habeas corpus effectively insulated the system of military
law from civilian law; therefore a military law system developed
that was independent of most constitutional provisions. Military
rights were spelled out in the UCMJ (or its predecessor) or in
military court decisions. Thus, a serviceman's constitutional rights
were temporarily suspended while he was in the military unless
those rights were also guaranteed in the UCMJ. The independ-
ence of the military law system was also evidenced by the fact
that military courts never cited civilian court decisions as stare
decisis unless they happen to concern jurisdictional issues.
The isolation of military law from federal court interference
was predicted on several premises: (1) Courts-martial are Art. I
courts, not Art. III courts; (2) Congress, by a liberal reading of
the Necessary and Proper Clause, has the sole authority to estab-
lish military rights; (3) Courts-martial are bodies primarily created
to administer military discipline in order to promote an effective
fighting force. The concept of a totally independent military law
system was shattered in a Supreme Court case decided in 1953.
Burns v. Wilson1 said that a person didn't give up all his consti-
tutional rights just because he was in the military. The Supreme
9. Grafton v. U.S., 206 U.S. 333 (1907) is the leading case on the inde-
pendence of military law.
10. Lack of jurisdiction is still the primary source of Supreme Court
case law granting habeas corpus review of military judgments. See
Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1 (1957), military has no power to try civilian de-
pendents of military personnel for capital crimes; Kinsella v. United
States, 361 U.S. 234 (1960), extending Covert to non-capital crimes;
Grisham v. Hagan, 361 U.S. 278 (1960), extending Kinsella to civilian
employees of military; O'Callahan v. Parker, 395 U.S. 258 (1969), mili-
tary cannot try military personnel for non-service connected crimes. The
basis for these decisions was a narrow interpretation of the Necessary and
Proper clause. The Court felt that military jurisdiction over non-mili-
tary personnel or non-service connected crimes could not be justified as
a "necessary and proper" function of military courts.
11. See note 1 supra.
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Court mandated the military courts to enforce the serviceman's
constitutional rights.
Decisions by the Supreme Court after Burns v. Wilson limited
the independence of military courts, but recognized that military
courts did not have to rank with Art. III courts in protecting an
individual's constitutional rights. The Court stressed that the ne-
cessity of military discipline prevents any requirement that mili-
tary law be identical to civilian law. A typical statement by the
Supreme Court is contained in Toth v. Quarles: 12
We find nothing in the history or constitutional treatment of mil-
itary tribunals which entitles them to rank along with Article
IH courts as adjudicators of the guilt or innocence of people
charged with offenses for which they can be deprived of their life,
liberty or property. Unlike courts, it is the primary business of
armies and navies to fight or be ready to fight wars .... 13
The disciplinary function of courts-martial was voiced again by
Justice Douglas in O'Callahan v. Parker:'4 "[A] court-martial is
not yet an independent instrument of justice but remains to a sig-
nificant degree a specialized part of the overall mechanism by
which military discipline is preserved."15  Unfortunately, the
balance of Justice Douglas' dissertation on military discipline in
O'Callahan produced an exaggerated and unwarranted attack on
the whole military justice system: "[C]ourts-martial as an institu-
tion are singularly inept in dealing with the nice subleties of
constitutional law."'16 This view gives no credit to the military
courts for their responsiveness to civilian law. The major im-
petus for this responsiveness has been the large number of ha-
beas corpus cases since Burns v. Wilson.
Federal Habeas Corpus Review: Burns v. Wilson to the Present
Burns v. Wilson is the fountainhead for federal court review
of military court decision in which there is a claim of deprivation
of constitutional rights. Unfortunately, it was a poorly written,
cryptic, plurality decision 17 that has to this day produced a myriad
12. 350 U.S. 11 (1955).
13. Id. at 17.
14. 395 U.S. 258 (1969).
15. Id. at 265.
16. Id.
17. Most of the references in note 30, infra, have criticized Burns.
of views in the circuits as to precisely what the criteria are for
granting habeas review. In the decision, the Court demanded
that the military must protect an individual's constitutional rights,
except those which expressly or by implication, do not apply to
the military. If these rights are not fully and fairly considered
by the military courts, then federal courts can grant habeas cor-
pus providing the person seeking habeas has exhausted his mili-
tary remedies. Burns raised three questions which still have not
been resolved in subsequent decisions: (1) which rights by impli-
cation do not apply to the military, (2) what does "fully and fairly
consider" mean, (3) what constitutes exhaustion of military rem-
edies.
The so-called implication exception is currently used in two dif-
ferent contexts. Some rights are restricted or denied because of
the necessity of military discipline, as briefly discussed above.
Other rights are deemed not to apply to the military because by
historical implication they were never meant to apply to the mil-
itary. For example, the right to trial by jury, guaranteed by the
sixth amendment, has been denied to military personnel.1 8 De-
nial was rationalized on the basis that military defendants have
always been tried by courts-martial without a jury. Since courts-
martial were in use before the Bill of Rights were enacted, the
founding fathers would have expressly abolished them if they had
so desired.
A recent example of divergent court views on the implication
exception concerns the right to counsel. Two different ex-service-
men petitioned federal district courts claiming that they were de-
nied the right to legal counsel in special courts-martial. Applica-
tion of Stapley1 9 decided that the sixth amendment right-to-coun-
sel provision applied to the military. The court stated that there
was no necessity or discipline requirement to preclude the right
of counsel at special courts-martial. Citing Burns, Stapley estab-
lished that the serviceman was denied a basic constitutional right.
In Kennedy v. Commandant20 the petitioner cited Stapley as prece-
18. Ex Parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1 (1942). See Larkin, note 8 supra, for
good discussion concerning which of the Bill of Rights apply to the
military.
19. 246 F. Supp. 316 (D. Utah 1965).
20. 258 F. Supp. 967 (D. Kan. 1966), aff. on other grounds, 377 F.2d 339(10th Cir. 1967). The Stapley and Kennedy decisions are discussed in de-
tail in Barker, Military Law-A Separate System of Jurisprudence, 36
U. CiN. L. REv. 223 (1967); Note, Military Justice and Due Process: Con-
cerning the Right of Representation and Judicial Review-An Analysis of
Kennedy v. Commandant and Application of Stapley, 2 JOHN MARSHALL
J. op PRAc. Ams PRO. 326 (1969).
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dent. The district court summarily rejected the Stapley rationale
and stated that if military due process was followed, then an ex-
serviceman was precluded from a collateral attack in a federal
court. Although the decision was primarily based on an Art. I,
sec. 8 independence argument (an argument discredited by
Burns), the court also said that, by historical implication, counsel
need not be provided at courts-martial. The counsel requirement
at special courts-martial was partially resolved by Art. 19 of the
Military Justice Act of 1968.21 Art. 19 now requires that a defend-
dant be represented by a lawyer if the court might impose a bad
conduct discharge. Generally, the implication test by federal
courts today concerns to what extent constitutional rights apply to
the military, rather than whether or not they apply. This is par-
ticularly true in the field of speech, religion and equal protection
rights. When military personnel seek habeas corpus in speech
cases, the federal courts invariably reject their claims by saying
that the necessity for military discipline precludes speech rights
as expansive as those enjoyed by civilians.
In Cortright v. Resor,2 2 members of an army band sought a writ
of mandamus to restrain the army from transferring various
members to other bases, alleging that the army was acting il-
legally by chilling the petitioners' first amendment rights. Peti-
tioners in Cortright had protested the Vietnam war by signing their
names to an anti-war ad appearing in the New York Times. They
also persuaded their wives to wave anti-war signs at a Fourth of
July parade in which the band participated. In fact the wives at-
tempted to march in the parade. The district court in a long
and well reasoned opinion rejected the government's contention
that the transfer orders did not chill first amendment rights, also
rejecting an argument that the military alone determines the scope
of speech rights. The Second Circuit reversed the decision, 23 say-
ing that a challenge to transfer orders did not present a justiciable
issue, basing its decision on administrative law. In dicta, there
was criticism of the district court decision. The court felt that
the parade incident had a direct effect on military discipline, stress-
ing that the parade incident could promote insubordination. In
21. U.C.M.J., Art. 19, 10 U.S.C. § 819 (1968).
22. 325 F. Supp. 797 (E.D.N.Y. 1971).
23. 447 F.2d 245 (2nd Cir. 197.1), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 965 (1972).
conclusion, the Second Circuit felt that the district court also ex-
aggerated the scope of the chilling effect of the transfer orders.
The "fully and fairly consider" requirement of Burns has pro-
duced sharply divergent views in the circuits. Unfortunately, no
Supreme Court decision since Burns has clarified the test. A major
factor that has produced the divergent views is the so-called finality
clause, Art. 76 of the UCMJ.2 4 The finality clause states that find-
ings and decisions of military appellate courts shall be binding on
all United States courts. Since Art. 76 was enacted after Burns,
the federal courts said that habeas corpus was an implied excep-
tion to Art. 76. In United States v. Augenblick25 the Supreme
Court affirmed that habeas is an exception.
It has not been clarified by the Supreme Court as to what effect
Art. 76 has on the "fully and fairly" test. However, other courts,
notably the court of claims, have interpreted the finality clause as
precluding any review of evidentiary facts de novo by federal
courts if the facts were considered at all. Preclusion of reviewing
facts de novo is justified by reliance on a statement in Burns v.
Wilson:
[W]hen a military decision has dealt fully and fairly with an alle-
gation raised in that application, it is not open to a federal civil
court to grant the writ simply to re-evaluate the evidence.26
This is the so called law/fact dichotomy which continually appears
in recent habeas corpus decisions. The dichotomy is best stated
in Shaw v. United States:27
[W]e think that ... abstinence is not to be practiced where the
serviceman presents pure issues of constitutional law unentangled
with an appraisal of a special set of facts. That type of unmixed
legal question this court has always decided for itself.28
The narrow scope of review of military judgments varies dra-
matically from the scope of habeas corpus review exercised by
federal courts when reviewing civilian judgments. In civilian ha-
beas cases, federal courts will review evidentiary facts de novo. 29
For example, assuming a person is beaten and held incommunicado
for thirty days in a dark room (facts) and then confesses to a crime,
the issue of coerced confession is a conclusion of law based on a
set of particular facts. If this fact situation appeared in a mili-
tary judgment, a federal court following the law/fact dichotomy
24. U.C.M.J., Art. 76, 10 U.S.C. § 876 (1956).
25. 393 U.S. 348 (1969).
26. 346 U.S. at 142.
27. 357 F.2d 949 (Ct. Cl. 1966).
28. Id. at 954.
29. Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938) is the fountainhead case for
the scope of federal habeas corpus review of state court judgments.
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would not grant habeas if the military court considered these
facts. However if the factual situation appeared in a state court
judgment, the federal court would decide whether these facts con-
stitute a coerced confession in violation of the Constitution. To dis-
tinguish, a pure question of law might be whether the dying dec-
laration exception to hearsay violates the confrontation require-
ment of criminal trials. The federal court would consider this
question of law in both civilian and military habeas corpus cases.
The law/fact dichotomy, coupled with non-clarified Burns deci-
sions has produced striking variations in the federal courts on
the criteria for granting habeas corpus. Several law review ar-
ticles have analyzed and classified the different criteria used for
granting habeas.30 The various criteria are summarized below:
(1). Only review if there is a "traditional" jurisdiction problem.
(2). Only review questions of constitutional fact and law not con-
sidered at all if a crude injustice (i.e. denial of very basic
constitutional rights) will result.
(3). Only review questions of constitutional fact and law not con-
sidered at all by a manifest refusal of the military to consider.
(4). Review questions of constitutional law if the military courts
did not consider the question "fully and fairly" in light of
the constitutional importance of the question. Only review
fact if not considered at all by a manifest refusal of the mili-
tary.
(5). Review all questions of constitutional law. Review factual
questions if not considered at all by a manifest refusal.
(6). Review all questions of constitutional fact and law.
30. Comment, Military Courts-Martia--Scope of Review by Civilian
Courts-Violation of Constitutional Rights-Kauffman v. Secretary of the
Air Force, 415 F.2d 99 (D.C. Cir. 1969), 19 Am. U.L. REV. 84 (1970), Note,
Civilian Court Review of Court-Martial Adjudications, 69 COLumV. L. REV.
1259 (1969); Everett, Collateral Attack on Court-Martial Convictions, 11
U.S.A.F. JAG. L. REV. 399 (1969); Comment, Civilian Review of Military
Courts-Martial, 1971 U. ILL. LAW FoRUM 124 (1971); Comment, Federal
Jurisdiction-An Apparent Expansion of the Scope of Military Habeas
Corpus Review, 50 N.C. L. REV. 173 (1971); Weckstein, Federal Court Re-
view of Courts-Martial Proceedings: A Delicate Balance of Individual
Rights and Military Responsibilities, 54 MIL. L. REV. 1 (1971); Burris and
Jones, Civilian Courts and Courts-Martia7--The Civilian Attorney's Per-
spective, 10 Am. Cimi. L. REV. 139 (1972).
Of the six, the first scope of review is the narrowest. Courts
expounding this view give lip service to Burns' "full and fair"
test but then decline to review using a traditional independence of
military courts argument. This view is best explained in Kennedy
v. Commandant.31 The second and third opinions expounded by
a few courts preclude review unless the military manifestly re-
fuses to review constitutional claims.32  Probably a majority of
courts adhere to the fourth position which precludes review of
questions of law, unless the military courts did not "fully and fairly"
reviewed the constitutional claims.33 Of course, this scope of re-
view is precisely what Burns dictated. Although the opinions don't
state it as such, the fullness and fairness of review is usually
considered relative to the importance (i.e. fundamental right or
express right) of the right. Many courts of claims in back pay cases
follow the fifth opinion which allows review of all questions of
law.34 The sixth view, the most liberal, has been embraced by the
D.C. circuit in the leading case, Kauffman v. Secretary. Kauff-
man was decided in 1969 and remains the most liberal view of scope
of review to date. According to the D.C. Circuit the scope of re-
view for military cases should be identical to that for civilian ha-
beas cases. The court used a "jurisdiction" argument to justify full
review. Before Kauffman was decided, several courts of claims de-
cisions reasoned that constitutional defects in military courts caused
the military to lose jurisdiction of the case when the constitutional
defect arose. Thus, the D.C. Circuit argued that since lack of jur-
isdiction was the traditional grounds for granting habeas corpus,
the civilian courts can review all constitutional defects de novo.
In 1969, just before Kauffman, the Supreme Court considered
this argument in United States v. Augenblick.30 The majority
opinion denied habeas by stating that there were no constitutional
defects in the military trials (Augenblick had a companion case).
Nevertheless, Justice Douglas left the door open for the Kauffman
jurisdiction argument by stating:
[E]ven if we assume arguendo that a collateral attack [via a jur-
isdiction attack] on a courtmartial judgment may be made in the
Court of Claims through a back pay suit alleging a "constitutional"
defect in the military decision, these present cases on their facts
do not rise to that level.3 7
31. See note 20 supra.
32. The Tenth Circuit voices this narrow view of review.
33. The Seventh Circuit voices this.
34. See Shaw v. United States, supra note 27.
35. 415 F.2d 991 (1969).
36. See note 25 supra.
37. 393 U.S. at 351.
[voL. 10: 158, 1972] Comments
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW
Kauffman quoted this passage to justify full review; however
it is still an extreme minority rule, no other circuit having adopted
the reasoning. This decision was probably the high water mark of
the scope of habeas corpus review; unfortunately, no Supreme
Court since Kauffman, (or Burns for that matter) has clarified the
scope of review.
Military Response to Federal Habeas Corpus Cases
Prior to Burns, the Court of Military Appeals stated that sol-
diers' rights were those defined in the UCMJ. The traditional in-
dependence of military law argument was put forth to justify the
opinion that the constitution didn't apply to military personnel.
In United States v. Clay38 the CMA coined the phrase "military
due process," referring to the rights and procedures guaranteed
by the UCMJ and military appellate court decisions. The court
stated that civilian due process did not apply in the military.
Burns changed this.
From 1953 to 1960 the CMA recognized constitutional rights on
a piecemeal basis. For example, in 1954 the court recognized a
qualified first amendment right in United States v. Voorh'ees.39
Finally in 1960 the Court recognized that the Bill of Rights ap-
ply to the military. The CMA, in United States v. Jacoby4 ° said,
"[I] t is apparent that the Bill of Rights, except those which are
expressly or by necessary implication inapplicable, are available
to members of our armed forces."41 Three factors are important
concerning this case. First, the decision came seven years after
Burns, quite a long time to wait to give stare decisis effect to a
case. Second, the court did give stare decisis effect to Burns.
Jacoby is the first significant case by the CMA to recognize that
at least some Supreme Court cases and constitutional provisions are
binding on the military courts. Third, the court adopted the im-
plication language of Burns. This implication language has con-
stantly been used by the military to restrict rights which are en-
joyed by civilians.
An extraordinary increase in habeas corpus cases occurred dur-
ing the 1960's. Warren Court decisions in civil rights and criminal
38. 1 U.S.C.M.A. 74, 1 C.M.R. 74 (1951).
39. 4 U.S.C.M.A. 509, 16 C.M.R. 83 (1954).
40. 11 U.S.C.M.A. 428, 29 C.M.R. 244 (1960).
41. Id. at 430-31, 29 C.M.R. at 246-47.
procedure, coupled with dissident views of the Vietnam war,
prompted many military defendants to seek federal relief.
Understandably, the military courts were dismayed by this de-
velopment. They probably felt that the flood of habeas corpus
would eventually reduce the military justice system to a state of
impotency. The military was also afraid that federal courts, in a
zealous effort to civilianize military law, would lose perspective
concerning the fighting and discipline function of the military.
Military appellate courts responded by becoming more respon-
sive to constitutional demands and by opening new avenues of re-
view and relief within the military justice system.
A typical quote from a CMR decision illustrated the effect that
habeas corpus decisions have on military decisions: 42
There is the further present day consideration [to dispose of this
case] that administrative agencies and [federal] courts alike are
authorized to review, and less standoffish about reviewing and re-
versing, action completed [in military courts] in the past. Ashe v.
McNamara, 355 F.2d 277 (1st Cir. 1965); Shaw v. U.S., 357 F.2d
949 (1966 Ct. Cls.) .... Section 1552 of Title 10, U.S. Code, gives
to military department Secretaries, acting through civilian boards,
plenary power to correct military and naval records and to render
monetary and other compensation consequent thereon.43
Somewhat strict requirements to obtain review by the CMA of-
ten precluded review by this court. Many military defendants
(particularly those in special courts-martial), frustrated in their at-
tempt to seek military appellate review, sought federal habeas
corpus. The CMA, recognizing this trend took an innovative step
in the case United States v. Frischholz.4 4 The court adopted the
view that the All Writs Act 45 can be used by the CMA since it
is a Court established by Congress. In Frischholz, the court
specifically endorsed the use of the writ of error coram nobis. In
Levy v. Resor,4 6 the CMA endorsed the writ of mandamus and
habeas corpus for the court. Recently, the CMR decided that the
authority vested in the All Writs Act is available to the CAMR.
The CMR affirmed the use of coram nobis relief, in United States
v. Draughan.47
42. United States v. Gammon, 38 C.M.R. 694 (1967).
43. Id. at 698.
44. 16 U.S.C.M.A. 150, 36 C.M.R. 306 (1966).
45. 28 U.S.C. § 1651(a). This act permits all courts established by
Congress "[t]o issue writs necessary or appropriate in aid of their re-
spective jurisdiction and agreeable to common usages or principles of law."
This section permits federal courts to issue writs of mandamus, writs error
coram nobis, etc.
46. 17 U.S.C.M.A. 135, 37 C.M.R. 399 (1967).
47. 42 C.M.R. 447 (1970).
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Perhaps the most dramatic endorsement of extraordinary review
can be found in United States v. Bevilacqua.48 Bevilacqua was
convicted by a special court-martial and was unable to obtain
appellate review because his sentence was for less than one year.
Contending that he was deprived of a basic constitutional right,
Bevilacqua appealed to the CMA. The CMA accepted the appeal,
endorsing the use of a writ of extraordinary review by the CMA
in all cases where military defendants claimed that their constitu-
tional rights were violated. The CMA reviewed Burns and men-
tioned the increasing trend of military defendants to seek federal
habeas corpus cases. In particular, the court cited two "liberal"
habeas decisions, Application of Stapley49 and Ashe v. McNa-
mara.50  The CMA concluded with an impassioned statement that
the military justice system was responsive to constitutional claims
and cited the recent use of extraordinary writs.
One military law commentator 1 immediately saw the impor-
tance of the CMA granting extraordinary writs:
It seems clear that in its decisions concerning extraordinary reme-
dies, the Court of Military Appeals has been aware of the impor-
tance of providing an opportunity within the military justice sys-
tem for "full and fair consideration" of claims by accused persons
that their rights have been invaded. In this way the likelihood
is reduced of successful collateral attack in the Federal civil
courts.
5 2
Thus, by granting extraordinary relief, especially in constitu-
tional cases, the CIV[A effectively made themselves the final arbiter
of constitutional law in the military, not the federal courts. Since
exhaustion of military remedies is a condition precedent for federal
habeas corpus review (as dictated by Burns), the military defend-
ant would now be forced to appeal to the CMA before seeking
federal habeas corpus.
The CMA probably recognized that this would reduce the num-
ber of federal habeas cases; it probably has. After Bevilacqua
was decided, the U.S. Supreme Court recognized and approved the
CMA's use of extraordinary writs in United States v. Augen-
48. 18 U.S.C.M.A. 10, 39 C.M.R. 10 (1968).
49. See note 19 supra.
50. 355 F.2d 277 (lst Cir. 1965).
51. Everett, Collateral Attack on Court-Martial Convictions, 11 U.S.A.F.
JAG. L. REv. 399 (1969).
52. Id. at 406.
blick.5 3 In Noyd v. Bond54 the Supreme Court, citing Bevilacqua,
Frischholz, and Resor as authority, refused to grant petitioner's
request for habeas corpus as he failed to exercise his right to ml-
itary habeas corpus.
The Bevilacqua, Frischh'olz, Resor, Augenblick, Noyd line of
cases reveals the shrewd approach of the CMA. By becoming
more responsive to civilian law (i.e. use of writs and review of
constitutional law), the CMR has forced the federal courts to rec-
ognize new exhaustion of remedies requirements. These require-
ments discourage federal habeas corpus and tend to vest more
power in the CMR to decide constitutional issues. Civilian court
citing of military court decisions and vice versa also illustrate a
symbiotic relationship between military and civilian courts.
Unfortunately the CMR backtracked on the use of extraordinary
writs in the case United States v. Snyder,55 saying that extraordi-
nary review only applies to cases in which the CMA has the
power to ultimately review. Therefore in certain special courts-
martial, non-reviewable by the CMA because of statutory jurisdic-
tion limitations, the use of extraordinary writs is prohibited. For
example, sentences of one year or less, providing the discharge is not
a bad conduct or dishonorable one, are not reviewable by the
CMA. The use of extraordinary writs has probably been a direct
result of the pressure of federal habeas corpus. However, the mil-
itary courts have been extremely reluctant to cite federal habeas
corpus cases as precedent (unless they are U.S. Supreme Court
cases made expressly binding on the military courts) for defining
the constitutional rights of military personnel. This reluctance is
understandable in that military courts feel that the CMA or the
U.S.Supreme Court should be the only courts who mandatorily dic-
tate which rights exist in the military.
EFFECT OF FEDERAL COURT CONSTITUTIONAL LAW DECISIONS
ON MILITARY COURTS
Even after Burns was decided in 1953, there was still doubt
as to whether the CMAL would give strict stare decisis effect to
U.S. Supreme Court decisions on constitutional issues. In the 1950's
and early 1960's the usual procedure was for the CMA to endorse
a Supreme Court decision in a CMA decision. The CMA would
endorse it rather than say that the Supreme Court decision was
53. See note 25. supra.
54. 395 U.S. 683 (1969).
55. 18 U.S.C.M.A. 480, 40 C.M.R. 192 (1969).
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stare decisis. Lower military courts would rarely if ever cite
Supreme Court decisions until they were endorsed by the CMA.
This procedure effectively made the CMAT the final judge of con-
stitutional issues. Lower military courts (CAR) depended on the
CMA, not the Supreme Court, as having the final word on consti-
tutional law. The CMA developed case law by a judicious use of
cases on petition from the CMR.
The probable reasons that the military courts were insulated
from Supreme Court cases as precedent are manifold: (1) Prior
to Miranda v. Arizona,5" the UCMJ provided a criminal procedure
superior to the civilian system for protecting an accused's rights,57
(2) prior to the Vietnam buildup, the general view of discipline in
the military allowed little leeway for first amendment rights, (3)
prior to the late 1960's sex and racial equal protection actions were
rarely brought in the military. In other words the military was
insulated from the criminal procedure, equal protection, and first
amendment "revolution" for a long period of time.
After Miranda was decided, numerous military defendants ap-
pealed to the CMA claiming that the procedural safeguards out-
lined in Miranda applied to the military. Ironically, the Miranda
safeguards, although they exceeded existing UCMJ safeguards,
were prompted by a Warren Court observation that the UCMJ
provided a superior system for protecting an accused's rights.
Miranda type appeals to the CMA produced a landmark case,
United States v. Tempia.58 Here the issue of stare decisis effect
of Supreme Court decisions on military law was squarely presented.
All the old "independence" arguments were used by the govern-
ment to contend that Supreme Court decisions were not bind-
ing on the military.
Summarily dismissing the government's arguments, the CMA
mandated that Supreme Court decisions are precedent for military
courts in areas of constitutional rights which by implication are
not meant to be limited to civilians. One concurring opinion of
Tempia went so far as to say that military courts were inferior
56. 384U.S. 436 (1966).
57. The Art. 31 procedures of the UCMJ, Art. 31, U.C.M.J., 10 U.S.C.
§ 831 (1956), offered guarantees against self incrimination which were
much more liberal than civilian guarantees prior to the Miranda decision.
58. 16 U.S.C.M.A. 629, 37 C.M.R. 249 (1967).
federal courts and bound by Supreme Court decisions as any Arti-
cle III court would be bound.59 The language of Tempia contains
two important points: (1) Supreme Court decisions (and probably
lower court decisions) are stare decisis on all military courts on
certain constitutional issues, (2) the implication language promul-
gated in Burns and repeated in Jacoby6o still allows the military
to have some freedom in deciding which Supreme Court decisions
to give stare decisis effect.
Burns and Tempia are still the fountainhead cases on the scope
of constitutional law in the military and the interrelationship of
civilian and military court decisions on constitutional law. After
Tempia, the military courts readily adopted the criminal proce-
dure decisions of the Supreme Court. Indeed, military defendants
soon obtained the best of two worlds: the UCMJ's guarantees of
an accused's rights as well as federal guarantees. The military de-
fendant's lawyer could now use UCMJ provisions, CMR decisions,
CMA decisions, recent Supreme Court decisions, and probably re-
cent lower federal court decisions to defend his client.
An example of this "dual" criminal procedure system, cited by
Birnbaum, 61 follows. In 1955 the CMA decided in United States v.
BalI62 that a military defendant didn't have to be given his fifth
amendment rights before a handwriting exemplar was taken from
him. This was an interpretation of the Art. 31 provision of the
UCMJ3 which outlines the fifth amendment rights of an accused.
United States .v. Minnifield"4 overruled Ball and said that exem-
plars required a fifth amendment rights warning. Gilbert v. Cali-
fornia,65 a 1967 United States Supreme Court case, held that hand-
writing exemplars don't violate the fifth amendment and therefore
a defendant need not be warned of his rights before giving an
exemplar. Two weeks after Gilbert was decided, the CVA had an
opportunity to overrule Minnifield in light of Gilbert. The CMA
refused to do so in United States v. White60 reasoning that the
CMA decision in Minnifield was an interpretation of the Art. 31
rights afforded by Congress rather than a constitutional question.
Birnbaum concludes that the military enjoys more fifth amend-
59. Id. at 641, 37 C.M.R. at 261 (Kilday, J.).
60. See note 40 supra.
61. Birnbaum, The Effect of Recent Supreme Court Decisions on Mili-
tary Law, 36 Fon uw L. REv. 153 (1967).
62. 6 U.S.C.M.A. 100, 19 C.M.R. 226 (1955).
63. U.C.M.J., Art. 31, 10 U.S.C. § 831 (1956)
64. 9 U.S.C.M.A. 373, 26 C.M.R. 153 (1958).
65. 388 U.S. 263 (1967).
66. 17 U.S.C.M.A. 211, 38 C.M.R. 9 (1967).
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ment rights than civilians are allowed under Schmerber v. Cali,
fornia,67 which holds that non-testimonial evidence, such as hand-
writing exemplars, does not violate the fifth amendment.
Prior to Tempia, the CMR was very reluctant to cite federal
court decisions as precedent. After Tempi, the courts were
much less reluctant to cite recent federal cases as stare decisis in
the criminal procedure area. A recent example is United States
v. Pullen.68 The search and seizure issue in the case was resolved
by the CMR by citing Terry v. Ohio,69 Katz v. United States70
and Chimel v. California7l as precedent. United States v. Lock-
hart72 cited a recent Supreme Court case, Chambers v. Maroney73
as precedent. Not one CMA decision was cited as precedent.
These cases illustrate a recent trend in the intermediate appel-
late courts in the military. Prior to Tempia almost all precedent
cited in CIR cases were CMA decisions. The CMR would gener-
ally wait until the CMA endorsed a Supreme Court decision be-
fore citing it. Now the CMR's are willing to cite U.S. Supreme
Court, Courts of Appeal, and even district court decisions as prece-
dent in the criminal procedure area.
In areas of constitutional law other than criminal procedure, the
military courts are rather reluctant to cite U.S. Supreme Court
cases. This is particularly true of first amendment rights or equal
protection rights. Military courts justify this reluctance by quot-
ing the "implication" words of Burns, Jacoby, Tempia, and stress-
ing the discipline function of the military. Rather than not recog-
nize a first amendment right, the military courts desire to limit
that right to preserve discipline.
Sherman, a learned military law commentator, recently com-
mented on the scope of a soldiers first amendment rights. 74 He
analysed recent first amendment cases decided by the CMA,70
67. 384U.S. 757 (1966).
68. 41 C.M.R. 698 (1970).
69. 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
70. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
71. 395 U.S. 752 (1969).
72. 43 C.M.R. 968 (1971).
73. 399 U.S. 42 (1970).
74. Sherman, The Military Courts and Servicemen's First Amendment
Rights, 22 HASTINGs L.J. 325 (1971).
75. United States v. Howe, 17 U.S.C.M.A. 165, 37 C.M.R. 429 (1967);
concluding that the CMA invariably refused to cite recent U.S. Su-
preme Court cases as precedent in the various cases. Indeed in the
Howe70 case, the sole Supreme Court decision cited was Whitney
v. California,71 a 1927 case. Of course, the CMA is understandably
trying to avoid a recent liberal trend of first amendment rights
established by the Supreme Court, in order to preserve discipline.
In fact, recently the ClVA transformed the clear and present dan-
ger test of speech to a clear and present danger to military disci-
pline test.
In concluding, Sherman stated that the military still has a very
restricted first amendment right. The CMA is loath to give stare
decisis effect to liberal Supreme Court first amendment decisions.
He also indicated that the CMR rarely cites federal cases as prece-
dent for first amendment cases before the cases are endorsed by
the CMA; whereas in criminal procedure cases, the CMR shows
no reluctance to cite nothing but federal cases as precedent. Sher-
man believes that the timidness of the CMR to exhibit some inde-
pendence in the non-criminal procedure areas is one of the basic
weaknesses of the CMR.
Even though the first amendment right in the military is still
a restricted one, the CMA has shown some degree of responsive-
ness to Supreme Court cases as evidence in the Voorhees,7 8
Gray71 line of cases. In recent cases, the CMA has tightened the
discipline requirement by requiring a showing that speech has a
direct effect on discipline before a defendant may be convicted.
Liberalization of military law by the CMA has had the desired
effect. Federal courts (at least at the court of appeals level) have
been demonstrating an increasing tendency to refuse to grant ha-
beas corpus. Cortright v. Resor,80 mentioned earlier, is the classic
example. In reversing the district court, the court of appeals
cited the liberalizing trend of the CMA, refusing to overrule the
military on the discipline issue.
Federal courts, however, have recently shown a breakthrough in
granting habeas in cases other than criminal procedure or speech.
The D.C. Circuit reversed the district court8l in Anderson v.
United States v. Daniels, 19 U.S.C.M.A. 529, 42 C.M.R. 131 (1970); United
States v. Harvey, 19 U.S.C.M.A. 539, 42 C.M.R. 141 (1970); United States v.
Gray, 20 U.S.C.M.A. 63, 42 C.M.R. 255 (1970).
76. See note 75 supra.
77. 274 U.S. 357 (1927).
78. See note 39 supra.
79. See note 75 supra.
80. See note 22 supra.
81. 316 F. Supp. 1081 (D.D.C. 1970).
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Laird 2 and held that required attendance at military academy
chapel violates the first amendment prohibition against establish-
ing a religion. The court refused to accept the argument by the
government that required chapel strengthens military discipline.
This and other cases will undoubtedly put pressure on the CMA to
"liberalize" other constitutional rights.
CONCLUSION
The result of the interplay of civilian and military law has pro-
duced a criminal justice system in the military that in many re-
spects is superior to the civilian system. Nevertheless, constitu-
tional rights other than rights of an accused are still generally re-
stricted in the military. Speech is frequently restricted under a
sweeping military discipline argument.
I feel that the federal courts should show a greater tendency to
grant habeas corpus in the speech and equal protection areas. This
would put the pressure on the military to expand these rights.
Perhaps what is needed the most is a Supreme Court decision
clarifying the full and fair test of Burns. Such a decision would
put the federal courts on firmer ground, allowing them to at least
know when they can grant habeas corpus. There is such a diver-
gence in the circuits as to the meaning of Burns that most habeas
petitions are denied because courts give a very restricted interpre-
tation of Burns. Furthermore, the CMR should exhibit more in-
dependence from the CMA on constitutonal issues other than
criminal procedure. This independence might induce the CMA to
be less reluctant to cite Supreme Court cases as stare decisis.
To summarize, some aspects of the military justice system are
superior to their civilian counterparts. A continued responsive-
ness by military courts to civilian law may someday produce a
system superior in all respects.
MICHAEL 0. CLARK
82. 466 F.2d 283 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
